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Abstract: We consider fingerprinting under collusion attacks in the Hamming space, using the
framework of [SBM05]. We construct a family of fingerprinting codes efficient against coalition
of arbitrary size: Using this family, tracing dishonest users can be done without error and in
polynomial time. The number of users is exponential in the length of the code. The proposed
construction relies on centered error correcting codes [BP99] for which we discuss two construc-
tions. Our results have an amazing relation with an upper bound on the number of users derived
in [SBM05]: dropping two assumptions we construct codes beating their bound, still keeping
practical properties.
Key-words: bound, capacity, centered error correcting codes, construction, covering codes,
fingerprinting, random codes, Reed-Solomon codes, marking assumption, distortion assumption.
∗ fabien.galand@irisa.fr
Construction explicite et approche the´orique en
fingerprinting
Re´sume´ : Nous e´tudions les attaques par collusion dans l’espace de Hamming en utilisant le cadre
de [SBM05]. Nous construisons une famille de codes anti-collusions efficace contre des coalitions de
taille arbitraire : cette famille permet un trac¸age sans erreur des utilisateurs malhonneˆtes et cela
en temps polynomial. Le nombre d’utilisateurs est exponentiel en la longueur. La construction
propose´e repose sur les codes correcteurs d’erreurs centre´s [BP99] pour lesquels nous e´tudions deux
constructions. Nos re´sultats entretiennent une relation e´trange avec une borne supe´rieure sur le
nombre d’utilisateurs obtenue dans [SBM05] pour les codes a` composition constante : les codes
que nous construisons, sans eˆtre a` composition constante, de´passent cette borne.
Mots-cle´s : borne, capacite´, codes correcteurs d’erreurs centre´s, construction, codes couvrants,
fingerprinting, codes ale´atoires, codes de Reed-Solomon, marking assumption, distortion assump-
tion.
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1 Introduction
When distributing digital contents, one may want to prohibit redistribution of the contents, for
example when one sells video. A reasonable requirement to enforce this prohibition is to be able
to trace users have redistibuted their copies.
This can be achieved in a simple way if users do not collude, and just redistribute their
own original copies : the dealer can embed, in a robust way, a kind of serial number in each
copy. Watermarking techniques address this embedding issue. Fighting collusion of users is more
involved.
Since the introduction of this topic by [BMP85], the most studied framework is the so-called
marking assumption popularized by [BS98]. In this setting, the extra data is a collection of
marks, that is a n-tuple over some alphabet Σ. The marking assumption states that, possibly
after being proceeded by some decoder, a fake copy created by some colluders will contain a n-
tuple z = (z0, ..., zn−1) such that in each position i ∈ {0, ..., n− 1}, at least one of the colluder has
symbol zi in position i.
A more recently investigated model is the one used in [SBM05]. Here, the marking assumption
is replaced by two constraints. The first is related to the creation of user copies : the copies must
be close to the original content. The second concernes the possible fakes : a fake copy can be
created by a coalition of dishonest users if and only if the fake copy is close enough to, at least,
one of the members’ copies. For these reasons, we will call this model the distortion assumption.
In those models, several problems arise. Among them, there are
1. the effectiveness of the solution proposed, that is the possibility to create the user copies and
to trace dishonest users from fake copies using polynomial time algorithms in the content
length;
2. the scalability, that is, essentially, the asymptotic behaviour of the user rate in function of
the other parameters.
In this work, we will address these two problems in the settings of [SBM05], namely what we call
the distortion assumption. We will see, that in a very surprising fashion, it is possible to tune
the parameters of the fingerprinting systems in such a way that we avoid any benefit of collusion.
This is very different from what can be done with the marking assumption (e.g. [BBK03]).
In [SBM05], the maximum number of users is investigated, under the distortion assumption and
in a non constructive way, for a family of fingerprinting systems. It is proved that the logarithm
of this maximum scales with O(1/L) and goes to zero if L grows linearly with n.
In this paper, we construct a family of binary fingerprinting codes with exponentially many
users (in the content length). This family allows efficient user copy creation and dishonest user
tracing : both of these issues can be solved with polynomial time algorithm. Moreover, our
fingerprinting codes have a very interesting new property: they are effective against coalitions of
arbitrary size. This, with the exponential number of users, implies that our codes beat the bound
derived in [SBM05] and, so, that the family of fingerprinting systems considered in [SBM05] is
inefficient.
To achieve efficent fingerprinting codes, we heavily rely on centered error correcting codes.
In fact, we prove that fingerprinting for collusion attack under the distortion assumption is a
generalisation of error correction for centered codes. Thus, we address fingerprinting via the
particular problem of centered codes.
The paper is organised as follow. In Section 2 we present the framework for fingerprinting
codes under the distortion assumption and our notation. Section 3 gives basic facts about the
centered error correcting codes, and states a simple upper bound. We address the construction of
centered codes in Section 4: First, in Section 4.1 we consider (unpractical) random construction
to obtain lower bound and in Section 4.2 we give a construction which is fully practical. Section
5 explains how to use centered error correcting codes to construct fingerprinting codes. We also
show how this construction allows to fight coalition of arbitrary size. We detail the parameters
achieved when using the centered codes constructed in Section 4.2. Section 6 briefly compares
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our results and others results on the capacity of some fingerprinting systems obtained in [SBM05].
Finally, we conclude pointing out an important difference between the model we use here and the
marking assumption.
2 Fingerprinting Formal Problem
We have a set V ⊂ Fn of original data, which can be seen as sequences of length n over some
alphabet F. In order to fingerprint some copyright protected data v, the dealer is allowed to
change at most ∆o coordinates, that is a fingerprinted copy of v is in B∆o(v) = {y : d(v, y) ≤ ∆o}
— d is the Hamming distance over Fn —, the ball of center v and radius ∆o.
Definition 2.1 An (n, M, ∆o) fingerprinting code is a mapping, E : V ×M→ Fn, such that
1. |M| = M ;
2. Ev : m 7→ E(v, m) is injective for all v ∈ V, i.e.
∀(m, m′) ∈M2 Ev(m) = Ev(m′) =⇒ m = m′ ;
3. ∀v ∈ Fn E(v,M) ⊂ B∆o(v) (E(v,M) being the set of all possible fingerprinted copies of
v)
A coalition U ⊂ E(v,M) is a set of fingerprinted copies of some v ∈ V , and a forgery f created
by this coalition must satisfy :
∃c ∈ U d(c, f) ≤ ∆f ,
for some fixed value ∆f . Thus, the set of forgeries computable from a set U is
forg∆f (U) =
⋃
c∈U
B∆f (c) .
Definition 2.2 A fingerprinting code is said to be (L, ∆f)-secure if there exists a mapping D :
F
n → Fn (called the tracing or decoding mapping), such that for any v ∈ Fn and any coalition
U ⊂ E(v,M) of size at most L,
D
(
forg∆f (U)
) ⊂ Û ,
where Û is the set of messages corresponding to the copies in U , Û = {m | E(v, m) ∈ U}.
Remark that this definition of secure fingerprinting codes do not allow any kind of probability of
error, neither a failure in the decoding (no output), neither to frame an innocent user. Moreover,
we do not require any knowledge of the original data v.
In the sequel, we will set V = Fn, with F the finite field with 2 elements. The number of users
M will be a power of 2, M = 2`. The set M will be [1, M ], and when it will be convenient, we
will identify an integer with its binary expansion, and M with F`.
3 Centered Error Correcting Codes
Centered error correcting (CEC) codes, which were introduced in [BP99], are a generalization of
the classical notion of error correcting codes.
Roughly speaking, we add a condition on the localization of the codeword c encoding a message
: we have a pair (v, m) and c must be within the ball BT (v) of center v and radius T , where T is
a new parameter of the code.
Definition 3.1 A centered error correcting code of parameters (n, M, T, 2e + 1) is defined by an
encoding mapping E : Fn ×M→ Fn such that
INRIA
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1. ∀(v, m) and (v′, m′) 6= (v, m),
Be(E(v, m))
⋂
Be(E(v
′, m′)) = ∅
2. ∀(v, m), E(v, m) ∈ BT (v)
The first condition is a classical one to allow correction of e Hamming errors. The second condition
is the localization constraint.
As easily seen, setting T = n leads to the usual definition of error correcting codes since the
condition 2) of the above definition is then always satisfied.
Another way, equivalent to Definition 3.1, to define CEC codes is by mean of coverings.
Proposition 3.2 A centered error correcting code of parameters (n, M, T, 2e+1) is a set {Ci} of
M disjoint coverings of radius T of the space Fn, distant from each other of at least 2e + 1 :
1. ∀i,
⋃
c∈Ci
BT (c) = F
n;
2. ∀i, j 6= i , ∀(c, c′) ∈ Ci × Cj , d(c, c′) ≥ 2e + 1.
Proof. The sets E(Fn, m), where m ∈ M, are coverings of radius T : for all v, E(v, m) is at dis-
tance at most T from v by 2) of Definition 3.1. Moreover, those sets are 2e+1 apart from each other:
otherwise, there exist couples (v, m) and (v′, m′) 6= (v, m) with Be(E(v, m))
⋂
Be(E(v
′, m′)) 6= ∅,
which would contradict 1) of Definition 3.1. The reverse way can be proved as easily as this one.

3.1 On Non-Existence Results
The following lemma, which can by found in [BP99] allows to derived an upper bound on the
cardinality M of a CEC code.
Lemma 3.3 Let T and e be non negative integers, with T ≥ e. Denote by Na(Y ) the set of binary
words at distance at most a from the set Y
Na(Y ) =
⋃
y∈Y
Ba(y) .
Then, for all set Y , the following inequality holds∣∣∣∣NT (Y )Ne(Y )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣VTVe
∣∣∣∣ ,
where Va is the cardinality of a ball of radius a.
Consider a CEC code of parameters (n, M, T, 2e+1) with encoding mapping E. We will apply
this lemma to the set
Y (m) = {c | ∃v E(v, m) = c} = E(Fn, m)
of codewords that encode some message m. The set Y (m) is a covering of radius T , thus
|NT (Y (m)) = 2n| .
On the other hand, since the balls of radius e centered on the elements of Y (m) are disjoint, we
have
M ≤ 2
n
Ne(Y (m))
≤ NT (Y (m))Ne(Y (m)) .
Lemma 3.3 yields
RR n
 
6080
6 F. Galand
Proposition 3.4 For all CEC codes of parameters (n, M, T, 2e + 1), we have the upper bound
log(M) ≤ log(VT )− log(Ve) .
The asymptotic behavior of the volume of the ball is well-known:
1. when the radius a grows linearly with the length n we have
log(Va) = n · h
(a
n
)
+ o(n) ,
where h(x) = −x log(x)− (1−x) log(1−x) is the usual binary entropy (e.g. see [MS96, chap.
10,
 
11, Cor. 9])
2. when the radius a is fixed and n grows to infinity,
log(Va) = a log n− log(a!) + o(1) .
We have therefore the following two asymptotic upper bounds
Corollary 3.5 For all (n, M, T, 2e + 1) CEC codes of length n large enough, we have
1. For τ = T/n and ε = e/n fixed,
log(M) . n · (h (τ) − h (ε)) .
2. For T and e fixed,
log(M) . (T − e) · log(n)− log
(
T !
e!
)
.
where we write f . g for f ≤ g(1 + o(1)) when n tends to infinity.
4 Constructing CEC Codes
4.1 On Existence Results
A simple way to construct CEC codes is to use linear codes.
Proposition 4.1 Let C be a [n, k, 2e+1] binary linear code. Let C ′ ⊂ C be a subcode of dimension
k′ and covering radius T . The cosets of C ′ in C, i.e. the sets x + C ′, x ∈ C, form a CEC code of
parameters (n, 2k−k
′
, T, 2e + 1).
Proof. The code C can be partitioned in 2k−k
′
cosets of C ′, the cosets are at distance at least
2e+1 from each other since they are composed of codewords of C, and these cosets have the same
covering radius as C ′, namely T . This is exactly the definition (in fact the equivalent one given
in Proposition 3.2) of a (n, 2k−k
′
, T, 2e + 1) CEC code. 
4.1.1 Encoding
Recall that, for encoding with a CEC code, each of the M = 2k−k
′
sets Ci is used to encode a
particular message m ∈ {1, ..., M}, i.e. a word c encodes the message m if and only if c ∈ Cm.
Moreover, a codeword encoding the message m for a center v can be found at distance at most
T , since T is the covering radius of each set Ci. Now, consider a parity-check matrix H of C. A
parity-check matrix H ′ of C ′ can be obtained by adding rows to H ,
H ′ =
(
H
Q
)
(1)
INRIA
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for some (k − k′)× n matrix Q. The cosets Ci of C ′ in C can be indexed in such a way that
Ci = {c ∈ Fn | c ·H = 0 and c ·Q = i}
(where needed, the integer i is identified with its binary expansion). So, we are looking for a word
E(v, m) such that
E(v, m) ·
(
H
Q
)t
=
(
E(v, m) ·Ht E(v, m) ·Qt)
= (0 m) .
We can choose E(v, m) = v + u where u is a solution of u · (H t Qt) = (0 m) with w(u) ≤ T .
4.1.2 Decoding
If a binary word z of weight at most e is added to a codeword E(v, m) to produce y, since E(v, m)
is a codeword of the e-error correcting code C, we can recover E(v, m) by adding to y the (unique)
word of weight at most e and syndrome y · H t, namely z. Then, we retrieve the message by
computing (y + z) ·Qt.
4.1.3 An Asymptotic Lower Bound
When τ = T/n and ε = e/n are fixed and n grows to infinity, two classical results on random binary
linear codes allow to derive the asymptotic behavior of CEC codes constructed in Proposition 4.1.
We sum up these classical results in the following theorem and refer to [Bar98, Lem. 1.2 and Th.
3.4] for detailed proofs.
Theorem 4.2 Let α be a real number less than 1/2 and let n grow to infinity. A [n, n · (1−h(α))]
linear code has minimum distance at least
n · α
and covering radius
n · α · (1 + o(1))
with probability tending to 1.
Let C be a [n, n · (1 − h(2ε))] code. It has minimum distance at least 2 · n · ε with hight
probability and thus corrects errors of weight up to n · ε. Let C ′ ⊂ C be a subcode of dimension
n · (1− h(τ)) (this implies 2ε < τ): it has a covering radius n · τ with hight probability. Applying
the construction detailed at the beginning of this section leads to a CEC code with parameters
(n, 2n(h(τ)−h(2ε)), n · τ, 2 · n · ε) .
Proposition 4.3 Providing that τ > 2ε, the construction of Proposition 4.1 allows to achieve
centered error correcting codes with parameters
(n, M, n · τ, 2 · n · ε) ,
where
log M & n · (h(τ) − h(2ε)) .
The last proposition is to be compared to the corresponding upper bound stated in 1) of Corollary
3.5.
RR n
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4.1.4 Effectiveness
Centered error-correcting codes constructed with random codes have two main flaws that prevent
them from being usable in practice. First, we cannot verify the “assumed” parameters. In fact, it
is known by [Var97] and [McL84] that, for linear codes, the decision problems associated with min-
imum distance and covering radius computations are respectively NP-complete and Π2-complete
(the Π2 complexity class includes the NP class). Moreover, even efficient probabilistic algorithms
are not known. Second and even more painful, both encoding and decoding need to find words z
of weight at most respectively T and e with a particular syndrome with respect to a linear code
(in fact, decoding up to e for C and complete decoding for C ′). Unfortunately, this is an NP-hard
problem and, once more, we do not even know efficient probabilistic algorithm (e.g. see [Bar98]).
Nevertheless, using specific linear codes, this problem may be overcome. For instance, writing
BCH(e) the (narrow sense and primitive) binary e-error-correcting BCH code (see [MS96, Chap.
7,
 
6]), we can choose C = BCH(e) and C ′ = BCH(e′) with e′ > e, since those codes are nested,
i.e. C ′ is a subcode of C. For the choice (e, e′) equal to (1, 2), (1, 3) and (2, 3), the construction
is effective since complete decoding are known (see [Ber68] and [vHB76]). The corresponding
CEC codes have respectively the parameters (2r−1, 2r, 3, 3), (2r−1, 22r, 5, 3) and (2r−1, 2r, 5, 5)
(see [MS96, Chap. 9] and [CHLL97, Chap. 10] for the parameters of BCH codes).
A nice example of encoding and decoding, with C = BCH(1), C ′ = BCH(2) and r = 4, can
be found in [ZC91,
 
IV.C], where a construction similar to the one we presented in this section
(with the restriction e = 1) is described and applied to some BCH codes.
4.2 An Explicit Construction
The construction we propose relies on two codes: a direct sum of T binary Hamming codes of
length 2r−1 and an e-error-correcting code over a larger alphabet, the finite field with 2r elements,
denoted F2r . For the purpose of this construction, we will need to identify elements of vector space
F
r and elements of the field F2r . To do so, we choose a fixed basis of F2r over F, and write x
the element in F2r corresponding to x ∈ Fr. With a slight abuse in notation, we also write c
the element of FT2r corresponding to c ∈ FrT ' Fr × ... × Fr, where the identification is done
componentwise.
We will use the definition of CEC codes given by the Proposition 3.2 in the proof of the
following result
Theorem 4.4 Let C be a [T, k, 2e+1] code over F2r . There exists a binary ((2
r−1)·T, 2k·r, T, 2e+
1) centered code C. Moreover,
1. if C has a polynomial time encoding algorithm, so has C;
2. if C has a polynomial time decoding algorithm, so has C.
In the above theorem, the algorithms are polynomial with respect to the corresponding code
length, that is T for C and n = (2r − 1) · T for C.
Proof. Let C be the direct sum of T Hamming codes of length 2r − 1, thus the length n of C
is n = (2r − 1) · T , and let H be a parity check matrix of a Hamming code of length 2r − 1. A
parity check matrix of C can be obtained from H as a block matrix by
P =
 H 0. . .
0 H
 . (2)
We can now define our CEC code C, as the following set of cosets of C{
y + C : y · P t ∈ C
}
INRIA
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where P t is the transpose of P . Since cosets have the same covering radius as the code C, and C
has clearly a radius equal to T , we just have to prove that y + C and z + C are 2e + 1 apart when
y · P t 6= z · P t. If we have y′ = y + c1 and z′ = z + c2, where c1, c2 ∈ C, then
(y′ + z′) · P t = (y + z) · P t ∈ C \ {0} .
But, since P is a block matrix, grouping the coordinates of y and z by 2r − 1, that is, writing
y = y1 . . . yT and z = z1 . . . zT , for some yi,zi ∈ F2r−1, we have
(y + z) · P t =
(
(y1 + z1) ·Ht, . . . , (yT + zT ) ·Ht
)
.
On the other hand, C has minimal distance 2e + 1. Thus, there exist at least 2e + 1 coordinates
of (y + z) · P t that are different from 0. Equivalently, there exist 2e + 1 values of i such that
(yi + zi) ·Ht = (y′i + z′i) ·Ht 6= 0, i.e. such that d(y′i, z′i) ≥ 1. Finally, we get
d(y′, z′) =
∑
0≤j<T
d(y′j , z
′
j) ≥ 2e + 1 ,
completing the proof of the first part of the theorem.
To prove 1), we consider a word v and a message m. We use C to encode m in a codeword
cm ∈ C. Then, we look for a word E(v, m) at distance at most T from v in the coset of C of
syndrome cm (with respect to P ). This can be done by computing a word u of weight at most T
and syndrome cm + v · P t and taking E(v, m) = v + u, since
E(v, m) · P t = (v + u) · P t = v · P t + cm + v · P t
= cm .
The computational cost is an encoding in C and the search of u. For a direct sum of T Hamming
codes of length 2r − 1, the computation of u consists in T decoding of a Hamming code of length
2r − 1, so it is O(rT ) operations. Thus, if the encoding of m in a codeword of C can be done in
polynomial time, the overall computational cost of E(v, m) is polynomial.
To prove 2), we consider a word y at distance at most e from E(v, m). We can recover m in the
following way. First, compute the syndrome s = y ·P t. Since d(y, E(v, m)) ≤ e, s is at distance at
most e from E(v, m) · P t. But E(v, m) · P t is a codeword of C, and C can correct up to e errors.
So, performing a decoding on s allows to recover m. The total cost is T syndrome computations
with respect to H , and a decoding in C. So, it is polynomial if C can be decoded in polynomial
time. 
Remark that, in contrast to the construction of Proposition 4.1, the decoding used for the con-
struction do not recover the codeword E(v, m), but directly outputs the message m. Nevertheless,
it is possible to compute E(v, m): the codeword E(v, m) is the unique codeword in Be(y), since,
by hypothesis, y ∈ Be(E(v, m)) and, by 1) of Definition 3.1, Be(E(v, m)) ∪ Be(E(v′, m′)) = ∅
for (v′, m′) 6= (v, m). Thus, there exists a unique word u, of weight at most e, such that
y + u = E(v, m). But u · P t = cm + y · P t. Since we know m and y, we can compute right
hand side of the last equation. Finding the solution u of weight at most e is then possible, thanks
to the structure of P . Moreover, we can see that this is equivalent to the computation required
by an encoding in the centered code. So, if C has a polynomial time encoding, recovering E(v, m)
can be done in polynomial time.
Corollary 4.5 For 2r > T > 2e, there exist binary ((2r−1)T, 2r(T−2e), T, 2e+1) CEC codes with
polynomial time encoding and decoding algorithms.
Proof. Since q = 2r is greater than T , we can use for C a [T, T − 2e, 2e + 1] Reed-Solomon
code over F2r . 
The previous result gives us fully practical CEC codes. On the other hand, in view of asymptotic
analysis, it has a drawback: T has to be less than 2r. But, if we let the length n = T (2r − 1) go
to infinity with T ∝ n, this implies a fixed r and, so, a bounded T , and we have a contradiction.
RR n
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Using algebraic geometric codes [TV91] for C allows to drop the upper bound condition on
T . So, we can fix q = 2r (r must be even), and still have the length n of the CEC code going to
infinity. From [TVZ82], we can have, asymptotically, for C
k
T
≤ 1− 2e + 1
T
− 1√
q − 1
for e/T fixed. Thus we can state another corollary to Theorem 4.4.
Corollary 4.6 Let r be an even integer. Let τ = (2r − 1)−1 and ε such that τ > 2ε. For length
n large enough, there exist (n, M, n · τ, 2 · n · ε) CEC codes, with
log(M) & n ·
(
τ − 2ε− τ
2
r
2 − 1
)
· log
(
1 +
1
τ
)
.
5 Constructing Fingerprinting Codes From CEC Codes
Recall we want to distribute slightly different copies of some binary word v ∈ Fn to M different
users. A fingerprinted copy c must satisfy the following distortion criterion:
d(c, v) ≤ ∆o . (3)
The purpose is to trace illicit copies, computed from some fingerprinted copies where “to trace”
means to find one of the fingerprinted copy used to create the forgeries. An illicit copy f computed
from a set U of original copies must satisfy only a distortion criterion :
min
c∈U
d(f, c) ≤ ∆f . (4)
If we have a CEC code C with parameters (n, M, ∆o, 2∆f + 1), it is possible to solve the
fingerprinting problem by using the following scheme: denote by E the encoding mapping of C,
and give to the m-th user the fingerprinted copy E(v, m). Criterion (3) is clearly satisfied. Now,
if a coalition U creates an illicit copy f then, by (4), there exists m in U such that
d(E(v, m), f) ≤ ∆f .
But, C allows to correct ∆f errors. Thus, decoding f gives E(v, m) and we can recover at least one
member of U . Remark that the size of the coalition does not matter, which is a very interesting
property.
To be practical, this scheme requires that the code C has two important properties. On one
hand, C must have an efficient encoding mapping. On the other hand, it must have an efficient
decoding algorithm, which is far more restrictive.
From our constructions of centered codes in Corollaries 4.5 and 4.6, we deduce
Theorem 5.1 1. Let r, ∆o, ∆f be integers such that 2∆f < ∆o < 2
r. There exist binary
((2r−1)∆o, 2r(∆o−2∆f), ∆o) fingerprinting codes, with polynomial time encoding and decoding
algorithms, which are (∞, e)-secure.
2. Let r be an even integer, δo = (2
r − 1)−1 and δf be such that 2δf < δo. Then, for n large
enough, there exist (n, M, n · δo) fingerprinting codes that are (∞, n · δf)-secure, with
log M
n
&
(
δo − 2δf − 1(
2
r
2 − 1) (2r − 1)
)
log
(
1 +
1
δo
)
.
3. Let δo, δf be real numbers such that 2δf < δo < 1/2. There exist (n, M, n · δo) fingerprinting
codes that are (∞, n · δf)-secure, with
log M
n
& h(δo)− h(2δf) .
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6 On the Capacity Game of Private Fingerprinting Systems
Roughly speaking, the capacity is the highest possible rate of users log(M)/n. For a proper
definition, we need to weaken Definition 2.2 of (L, ∆o)-secure codes to allow some probability of
error pe in the decoding. In this case, we say that the fingerprinting code is (L, ∆f) − pe-secure.
Now, let n grow to infinity with ∆o = n · δo and ∆f = n · δf . The capacity C(L, δo, δf) is the
maximum rate of users log(M))/n over sequences of (n, M, n·δo) fingerprinting codes, of increasing
length, which are (L, n · δf)− pe-secure with pe decreasing to 0 at infinity.
The model we consider in this paper come from [SBM05], where the capacity of some finger-
printing systems is derived. The fingerprinting systems presented in [SBM05] fulfill two technical
assumptions ( [SBM05, Def. III.2 and III.3]) : The first one (constant composition) is a constraint
on fingerprinting codes, and the second (“smoothness”) is a constraint on sequences of finger-
printing codes. A practical consideration is given in order to justify the constant composition
assumption: essentially, it allows efficient computation of the fingerprinted copies.
To emphasize the different settings, we denote by C the capacity in the sens of [SBM05], that
is the capacity restricted to smooth sequences of constant composition codes. Basically, the results
are the following:
1. for a fixed coalition size L and the distortions ∆o = n · δo and ∆f = n · δf growing linearly
with the data length n, we have
C(L, δo, δf) = O
(
1
L
)
;
2. when L = n · ` grows linearly with n, then
C(n · `, δo, δf) = 0 .
At first glance, these results seem in contradiction with ours since in Section 5 we construct
(∞, δf)−0-secure fingerprinting codes with an asymptotic rate bounded away from zero. Precisely,
Theorem 5.1 states
C(∞, δo, δf) ≥

(
δo − 2δf − 1(
2
r
2 − 1) (2r − 1)
)
log
(
1 + 1
δo
)
h(δo)− h(2δf)
at least for some particular values of the parameters δo, δf and r. Of course, a possible reason to
explain this point is that our construction does not fulfill the two technical assumptions discussed
earlier.
At least, we can say that these assumptions have very important consequences and are not so
mild as suggested in [SBM05], since they drastically reduce the set of achievable rates. Moreover,
they do not lead to fingerprinting codes with more practical properties than our codes, since our
codes fulfill the practical considerations, and much more, used to justify the constant composi-
tion assumption. Stated in another way, constant composition fingerprinting codes seem to be
inefficient.
7 Conclusion
The model we consider in this paper was recently introduced in [SBM05]. This model allows
dishonest users to change any part in their own original copies as soon as they don’t change too
many bits, compared with at least one of their copies.
Recall another well known model, known as the marking assumption [BS98], which allows to
change positions in which at least two members of the coalition have different bits. Contrary
to intuition, the new model is less favorable to dishonest users than the marking assumption for
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which it is not possible to construct binary fingerprinting codes secure against coalitions, even
of size two, without allowing some probability of error in the tracing algorithm (see [BS98, Th.
IV.2]). Whereas with the model used in [SBM05], we can do it : Namely, we have proved that
binary fingerprinting codes without tracing error exist.
In fact, our proof leads to codes with a rate bounded away from zero with a new and interesting
property: these codes resist to coalition of arbitrary size. Some heuristic explaining this strange,
at first glance, effect is that the condition
∃c ∈ U, d(c, f) ≤ ∆f ,
is very restrictive, since it means that only a single member of the coalition, namely c, produces
a forgery f . Hence, despite that formally the new model deals with coalitions of dishonest users,
in fact it reduces to the case of a single user.
By exhibiting very good fingerprinting codes with interesting features, our constructive ap-
proach also allows us to prove that the capacity derived in [SBM05, Th. IV.1] for some finger-
printing systems doesn’t hold for general ones and that the constant composition assumption is a
severe restriction which eliminate, at least asymptotically, all interesting codes.
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